Free web proxies promise anonymity and censorship circumvention at no cost. Several websites publish lists with thousands of free proxies organized by country, anonymity level, and performance. However, these lists, populated via automated tools and crowd-sourcing, contain lots of unreachable, unreliable, and sometimes even malicious proxies. It is fair to say that little is known about the free proxy ecosystem. In this paper we shed light on this ecosystem via ProxyTorrent, a distributed measurement system that leverages both active and passive measurements. Active measurements discover free proxies, assess their performance and detect potential malicious activities. Passive measurements run at user premises (via a Chrome plugin) and collect statistics about proxy usage and performance in the wild. ProxyTorrent has been running since January 2017, monitoring up to 160,000 free proxies per day and totalling more than 1500 users. Our dataset shows that only half of the announced proxies have decent performance and that roughly 7% exhibit malicious behavior. Interestingly, malicious proxies are the ones that show the best performance, supporting the common belief that free proxies are "free for a reason". Also, we observe users do not have strong anonymity preferences and select proxies in countries where they are most available.
INTRODUCTION
Web proxies are intermediary boxes enabling HTTP (sometimes also HTTPS) connections between a client and a server. They are widely used for security, privacy, performance optimization or policy enforcement, to cite a few use cases. Many web proxies are free of charge and publicly available. Such proxies are mostly used for private web surfing and to access content that would be blocked otherwise (e.g., due to geographical restrictions).
Specialized forums, websites, and even VPN service providers 1 distribute daily lists of free web proxies. However, when tested, many of those proxies are slow, unreachable or not even real proxies. Furthermore, it is folklore that free web proxies perform malicious activities, e.g., injection of advertisements and user fingerprinting. To the best of our knowledge, only anecdotal evidence exists and no previous work has verified or quantified such claims.
Given the current landscape, it is fair to say that not much is known about the free proxy ecosystem. In this paper we shed light on this ecosystem with ProxyTorrent, a distributed measurement platform that continuously monitors free proxies with respect to performance, behavior, and usage. , https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn.
We daily feed our system with tens of thousands potential proxies by crawling some of the most popular and active websites that maintain list of free web proxies. Potential proxies are verified to discard the ones that are unreachable, that do not proxy traffic on behalf of users, and that perform malicious activities. This is done by fetching a "bait" webpage we have crafted as well as few popular websites, and comparing the content received via the proxy with the one received when no proxy is used. The same approach is used to detect issues with X.509 certificates in case of TLS connections. These operations run daily at our premises and generate a few thousand trusted proxies. Next, we test the performance of trusted proxies from ∼ 30 network locations (Planetlab nodes [15] ) while fetching the landing pages of popular websites via both HTTP and HTTPS. Collected data is finally used to populate a list of good, i.e., working and trustworthy free proxies.
We make the list of good proxies available to users via a browser plugin and collect statistics on how proxies are used in the wild. Users have only to select the desired anonymity level and the location where their traffic should be proxied. The browser plugin fetches from the list of good proxies the ones that match the user preference and that perform the best. As the user browse the internet through the proxy, we collect anonymous statistics on how free web proxies are used in the wild.
We use data collected by ProxyTorrent to provide a unique overview on the free proxy ecosystem. In this paper we present six months worth of data spanning up to 160,000 free web proxies and more than 1500 users. The analysis of our data-set reveals the following key findings:
The free proxy ecosystem is large and ever-growing, but only a small fraction of the announced proxies actually works. Out of 160,000 proxies tested across six months, only few thousands per day actually proxy traffic on behalf of users. We can only speculate the reasons why so many of the announced hosts are actually useless. Perhaps this is due to the ephemerality of free proxies. For example, some hosts proxy traffic due to misconfigurations until the administrator detects and fixes the error. Another possible reason is that VPN providers announce non-working proxies as bait for customers to buy professional VPN services.
A non negligible percentage of working proxies exhibit suspicious behavior. Every day, about 7% of the proxies announced on the Web that actually work, exhibit suspicious behavior from injection of advertisements to man-in-the-middle attempts.
Most of the available proxies are located in only few countries. Five countries host almost half of the available proxies and most of the malicious proxies are located in China.
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Malicious proxies provide the best performance. On average, malicious proxies are twice as fast as non-malicious ones. Fast connectivity is likely used to attract potential "victims". Our findings support the general belief that free proxies are "free for a reason".
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces both background information and related work. Section 3 describes in detail the design and deployment of ProxyTorrent. Next, Section 4 sheds some light on the free proxy ecosystem by leveraging six month worth of data collected via ProxyTorrent. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Background -A web proxy is a device/application that acts as an intermediary for HTTP(S) requests, such as GET and CONNECT, issued by clients seeking resources on servers. Web proxies are commonly classified as transparent, anonymous, and elite, depending on the degree of anonymity they provide. Transparent proxies reveal the IP address of the client to the origin server, e.g., by adding the X-FORWARDED-FOR HTTP header which specifies the address of the client. Anonymous proxies block headers that may allow the origin server to detect the identity of the client, but still announce themselves as proxies, e.g., by adding the HTTP_VIA header. Elite proxies do not send any of the above headers and look just like regular clients to the origin server. Yet, the origin server may detect that a proxy is being used by other means, such as probing the purported client address (i.e., the address of the proxy) to check if it proxies traffic.
Related Work -We now survey relevant results related to our work and highlight differences with ProxyTorrent. In-path manipulations. A number of papers measure in-path web content manipulations by leveraging bait content served from a controlled host. Reis et al., [16] focus on middleboxes and serve a page with an embedded JavaScript that detects and reports modifications. The data-set of [16] consists of 50,000 unique visits to their website, totaling 650 instances of content manipulation. Chung et al., [2] use the paid version of Hola [7] (a peer-to-peer proxy network) to detect end-to-end violation in DNS, HTTP, and HTTPS traffic. They witness DNS hijacking, HTTP manipulations, image transcoding, and a few cases of TLS man-in-the-middle attempts. Many of the violations reported in [2] are attributed by the authors to ISPs and to (malicious) software running on the clients of the Hola network that proxy traffic on behalf of other clients. Tyson et al., [18] use the same approach to investigate HTTP header manipulation. They leverage Hola to gather 143k vantage points in 3,818 Autonomous Systems (ASes) and detect header manipulation in about 25% of the ASes. Weaver et al., [20] focus on transparent proxies using Netalyzr [9] and detect HTTP proxy manipulations for 14% of the connections.
Differently from all of the above, we look at performance and content manipulations of free, non-transparent web proxy. We use bait content served from a controlled host, as well as content of real websites. Our measurement platform also leverages real users by means of a plugin that provides easy proxy usage in exchange of anonymous statistics on how proxies are used in the wild. Virtual Private Networks. Perta et al., [13] study privacy leaks in commercial VPN systems. They report traffic leakage despite a VPN tunnel for two main reasons. First, IPv6 traffic is usually not tunneled. Second, poor management of the DNS configuration at the client may result in an adversary hijacking DNS requests and learning the list of websites requested by a user. Similar issues related to DNS and IPv6 traffic tunneling are also reported by Ikram et al., [8] that analyze 283 Android VPN apps. The authors of [8] also detect VPN apps with embedded 3rd party tracking libraries and malware. We focus on free web proxies that are a valid alternative to commercial VPNs in use-cases such as accessing geo-blocked content. Furthermore, we also assess the performance of free web proxies, apart from their behavior. Non-transparent proxies. Scott et al., [17] also study free web proxies but their goal and methodology differ from ours. We mostly focus on free proxies behavior and performance, while [17] focuses on how and for what free proxies are used. To do so, the authors of [17] scan the IPv4 address space at popular proxy ports, looking for open management interfaces (i.e., proxy interfaces with no authentication required) from which they can "steal" usage statistics. Although we could have extended our methodology with the same approach, we concluded that the ethical concerns were not worth the outcome. Our Chrome plugin would indeed give us full visibility on the user behavior, but we limited data collection to the bare minimum ensuring a free and private service.
Finally, ProxyTorrent shares some similarities with proxycheck [6] . This tool checks the behavior of a proxy by using it to download few distinct objects hosted on a private webserver. proxycheck considers the proxy as untrusted if the retrieved objects differ from the original ones even by a single bit, potentially generating a large number of false positives. Proxies are tested one at a time, which only allows to test ∼10,000 proxies a day. Despite some similarities, our approach is fundamentally different since we designed a funnel-shaped methodology (see Figure 1 ) aiming to minimize false positives while maximizing performance, e.g., scaling up to hundreds of thousands proxies per day. 
PROXYTORRENT
This section describes ProxyTorrent, a distributed measurement platform built to monitor the free proxy ecosystem. Figure 1 shows an overview of the full system. Due to the scale of the proxy ecosystem -potentially millions of machines [17] -we use a funnel-shaped methodology with several phases (see Figure 1 ). Proxies are fed into the funnel and, at each phase, go through a series of tests of increasing complexity. Only proxies that pass a given phase are admitted to the next one. Since each phase decreases the number of proxies under test, we can progressively increase test complexity. The last phase takes place at the user and allows us to complement results of controlled experiments with measurements in the wild. Table 1 lists the key aspects of each phase. In the remainder of this section, we describe all phases in detail.
Phase I discovers free proxies (<ip, port> pairs) on the Internet by crawling several aggregator websites which regularly publish free proxy lists. Daily crawling runs from a single machine at our premises. The hosts discovered are used to populate a list of "potential proxies" sorted by the last day when each proxy appeared on any of the webistes we crawl.
Phase II tests the hosts on the list populated by Phase I for proxying capability. We use curl [3] , instrumented for full statistics and headers collection, to fetch a 1KB object via each potential proxy. The content is served using nginx [12] from a server hosted by Amazon (Ireland). Phase II runs daily from a single machine. It traverses the list populated by Phase I, starting from the top, and runs for up to 24 hours until either all proxies have been tested or until time is over. This strategy rules out the least recently crawled potential proxies, in case the list becomes too big to be processed in a day.
We associate a similarity score to each host, computed as the ratio of the content received through the host that matches the content fetched when no proxy was used. A similarity score of 1 means that the content fetched through the proxy is identical to one fetched without a proxy. Accordingly, a similarity score of 0 means that the content fetched through the proxy is completely different from what we fetched with no proxy.
Phase II categorizes hosts as follows. Unresponsive: hosts for which either a connection or max duration timeout was triggered. 2 Unreachable: hosts that either closed the TCP connection with a reset message or sent ICMP messages declaring the network or the requested host as unreachable. Working: hosts with a similarity score ≥ 0.5, i.e., that have correctly proxied at least 50% of the 1KB object we serve. Other: all the remaining hosts e.g., all the hosts returning a login page (private or paid proxies) or an error page (misconfigured hosts). We further classify working proxies as transparent, anonymous, or elite (see Section 2) using HTTP headers collected both at the client and at the server. HTTP headers of all proxies are also analyzed to identify header manipulations that can be potentially malicious. Finally, Maxmind [11] is also used to obtain country/AS information of each working proxy.
Phase III tests working proxies with respect to behavior and performance. To assess a proxy behavior, we use the previous methodology of comparing proxied content with content received when no proxy is used. Compared to Phase II, we introduce a headless browser, real content, HTTPS testing, and clients at multiple locations. For performance, we measure both page download time (PDT) and page load time (PLT). PDT is the time required to download the index page of a website; PLT is the time from when a browser starts fetching a website to the firing of the JavaScript onLoad() event, which occurs once the page's embedded resources have been downloaded, but possibly before all objects loaded via scripts are downloaded. Phase III consists of two parts (A and B) which both operate on the set of working proxies identified by Phase II within the last 7 days.
Phase III.A runs daily from a single machine at our premises. It uses PhantomJS [14] , a popular headless browser, to fetch a realistic website we serve. We designed the website to include elements that could trigger content manipulation by a proxy: a landing page index.html (83.7KB), two javascripts (635B and 22.9KB), two png images (1.5KB and 13.5KB), and a favicon (4.3KB). Our bait webpage is similar to the one set up by related work that looks for en-route content manipulation [2] .
Data is collected as an HTTP Archive (HAR); for this, we have extended PhantomJS's HAR capturer 3 to also dump the actual content downloaded. The HAR file includes detailed information about which object was loaded and when, as well as PLT. We stop Phan-tomJS either one second after the onLoad() event, to allow for potentially pending objects to be downloaded, or after a 45 second maximum duration timeout. Compared to Phase II, we increase the maximum duration timeout to account for an overall more complex operation.
Phase III.A also checks for issues with X.509 certificates. First, we use curl to connect to our server over port 433 and compare the X.509 certificate presented to the client with our original certificate (provided by LetsEncrypt [10] ). If curl detects any issue with the certificate, we use OpenSSL to download the X.509 certificates from our website as well as from two popular websites. 4 Phase III.A classifies a working proxy as trusted, suspicious, or unrated. Trusted proxies serve the expected content with no alteration and do not replace or modify X.509 certificates. Suspicious proxies alter the relayed traffic, e.g., by adding unsolicited content or by not relaying the expected X.509 certificates. Finally, unrated proxies operate at such a slow speed that they are incapable to serve the full content requested within the maximum duration allowed. However, the partial content they serve is as expected, otherwise we mark them as suspicious. Phase III.A quantifies the performance of trusted and suspicious proxies using the PLT of our realistic website.
Phase III.B runs daily from 30 Planetlab nodes. Curl is used to fetch, via each proxy in the working proxt list, the landing pages of Alexa's top websites. Precisely, we construct two 1,000-website lists from Alexa with support for HTTP and HTTPS, respectively. For each proxy and fetched page, Phase III.B reports both PDT and similarity score. Proxies are tested mostly against HTTP websites; only once every 10 tests a proxy is also tested for HTTPS support by fetching a random website from the HTTPS list. We empirically measured that phase III.B is currently capable of testing each working proxy at least once every 5 minutes.
Phase IV runs on the machines of the users that installed our Chrome plugin and allows us to test free web proxies in the wild. Users pick the desired anonymity level (transparent, anonymous, elite) and a location, and the plugin fetches from the back-end of ProxyTorrent a list of proxies that match the user's criteria, if any. In order to minimize risk and maximize usability, at this stage we only consider proxies that have been labelled as trusted in Phase III.A and that have shown the best performance in Phase III.B. For each webpage requested by the user through the proxy, we collect the following statistics: timestamps associated to the beginning and end of a download, PLT, number of requests per protocol type (HTTP/HTTPS), amount of bytes downloaded (HTTP/HTTPS), and navigation errors (if any). No personal information, such as IP address, browser/OS information, or URLs are reported at any time.
THE FREE PROXY ECOSYSTEM
This section characterizes the free proxy ecosystem. We first quantify its magnitude and evolution over time. Next, we provide data supporting (or not) the preconception that free proxies are mostly malicious and tend to manipulate served content. We then conclude by assessing the ecosystem performance and by providing some evidence on how free proxies are used in the wild. We report on 6 months worth of data (January-June, 2017) spanning more than 160,000 proxies and 1500 users. 4 Limitations We acknowledge from the outset the limitations of our methodology. According to our findings, roughly 7% of the proxies in our data-set exhibit malicious behavior by either injecting content, manipulating headers, or by replacing X.509 certificates. Nevertheless, this is a lower bound to the fraction of malicious proxy since an exhaustive behavioral analysis by only controlling a few clients and servers is out of reach. We stress, however, that related work that uses a setup similar to ours, shares the same limitations [2, 16, 18, 20] . A proxy could behave maliciously only in same cases in order to avoid detection. It may decide whether to manipulate content, based on contextual factors such as, the client IP address, the domain requested, etc. Our experiments revealed that only 20% of the malicious proxies manipulate the content of each requested page while many (40%) do so only for one out of ten page requests. The reasons behind this intermittent behavior is hard to grasp. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that a proxy that in our experiment proxied traffic without alterations, will not manipulate content when serving other users. Perhaps the content we requested or the IP address of our client simply did not trigger content manipulation at the proxy. Another form of malicious behaviour that we cannot fully assess is user tracking and profiling. Our experiments reveal several attempts to inject tracking/fingerprinting code, but we cannot rule out that even innocent-looking proxies carry out user profiling by simply leveraging the IP address of the user and her list of requests. We nevertheless argue that ProxyTorrent sheds some light on the free proxy ecosystem and that it improves the current situation for proxy users that are clueless on whether a given proxy is performing any kind of malicious activity with the relayed traffic. Furthermore, ProxyTorrent raises the bar for malicious proxies to avoid detection.
Characterization
Magnitude. Table 2 shows a snapshot of the free proxy ecosystem (June 18th, 2017). In order to understand the coverage of the aggregator websites we crawl, we supplement the crawling strategy by scanning the full IPv4 space and targeting the most popular proxy ports according to the aggregator websites. IPv4 address scanning leverages Zmap [4] from a number of machines we control. Because of the ethical issues related to port-scanning, we run the scan only once we do not use proxies found exclusively via scanning in the following experiments, nor we make them available to users. Table 2 reports proxies obtained by crawling the aggregator websites (first row), and the one found via port-scanning (second row). The table distinguishes between four hosts categories: unreachable, unresponsive, working, and other (see Section 3). Crawling yields a higher ratio of working proxies (2,895 out of approximately 160k) compared to port-scanning (2,518 out of more than 29M). Only 719 proxies appears in both data-sets. Regardless of the discovery strategy, the table shows that most hosts are either unresponsive or unreachable , and that only a few thousand hosts can actually be labeled as working proxies. The last four rows of Table 2 show the breakdown of the proxies discovered via scanning by port. Figure 2 shows the evolution over time of each proxy category as defined in Phase II. On the first day, we bootstrap ProxyTorrent with a list of potential proxies containing 118,915 hosts (<ip, port> pairs) collected on specialized forums. We then daily supplement such list via crawling. Overall, the figure shows that the working proxies category has a different trend than the others. While the number of hosts in each category increases over time, the number of working proxies oscillates between 900 and 3,000. During the reported period, we experienced the minimum number of working proxies on May 16th (1,900) while the maximum was reached on June 18th (3, 145) .
We now focus on the (small) core of working proxies for which further testing was conducted. Figure 3 shows the evolution over time of the size of the working proxy list (Total). Figure 3 also shows the evolution of the categories Trusted, suspicious (split between proxies that manipulate TLS certificates -Cert. Issueand proxies that manupulate actual content -Manipulation), and unrated. Figure 3 further shows the number of proxies that support HTTPS. 5 According to Figure 3 , every day roughly 53% of working proxies are marked as trustworthy, while around 40% are marked as unrated. Suspicious proxies amount to 7% of the total, where 100-300 proxies manipulate proxied content and only a handful of them is caught replacing X.509 certificates. On average, 45% of the proxies support HTTPS.
Takeaway: The proxy ecosystem is characterized by a small and volatile core of proxies surrounded by a large and increasing set of non-proxy hosts that are, for some reason, announced on aggregator websites.
Geolocation. Figure 4 and 5 show, for the top 20 countries and ASes, both the total number of proxies they host and the amount of suspicious ones. Both figures are computed considering all working proxies observed at least once during the six months monitoring period. United States (16%), China (10%), Brazil (8%), Indonesia (7%), and Russia (7%) host 48% of the proxies, while the remainder are located in 145 countries. A similar distribution is observable for suspicious proxies, with the main difference being that China hosts twice as many suspicious proxies as the US. As for the hosting ASs, about 20% of proxies are concentrated in only six ASs, while the remaining proxies reside in 1,355 ASs. Both ISPs and cloud service providers appear in the top 20 ASs.
(In)stability. Next, we explore the stability of the proxies located in the (usable) core of the free proxy ecosystem. We report their lifetime, the number of days between the first and the last time a proxy has been active, and their uptime, the number of days a proxy was active within its lifetime. Both metrics are derived using a proxy's IP address and port as an identifier; our estimates are thus lower bounds in presence of dynamic addressing. Figure 6 shows the CDF of lifetime and uptime over 6 months, distinguishing between all proxies and the suspicious ones. Proxies tend to have a long uptime, e.g., 55% of the proxies are available for their whole lifetime, regardless if they are suspicious or not. The figure also shows that suspicious proxies have a significantly shorter lifetime compared to the rest of the ecosystem, e.g., a median lifetime of 15 versus 35 days (20% of the monitoring period).
Roughly half of the monitored proxies lasts up to a month. This result suggests that free proxies are fairly unstable over time. This can be due to dynamic addressing, for example when proxies run on residential hosts where they get their IP assigned by a dhcp server. Another possible reason is that some proxies serve public traffic due to misconfigurations that are eventually discovered and fixed by their administrator. The shorter lifetime measured for suspicious proxies could also be intentional, i.e., dynamic addressing might be used as a mean to circumvent banning from remote servers.
Takeaway: The core of the free proxy ecosystem is characterized by an high level of instability which makes locating a usable proxy extremely challenging. Half of this core resides in a handful of countries, with the US leading the pack of trusted proxies and China the pack of suspicious ones.
Behavior
Across six months, we discovered 29,199 working proxies of which 52.7% were labeled as trusted, 41% unrated, and 6.3% (i.e., 1,068 proxies) suspicious. This subsection focuses on suspicious proxies to comment on their behavior.
Suspicious Behavior Classification
Suspicious proxies have manipulated 2,476 times the objects we serve, ranked as follows: html (1,838 times), javascripts (597 times), and images (41 times). Unsolicited content injection, instead, mostly consists of javascripts, though we also spotted few php and image injections. Overall, we witnessed 228 unique manipulations of served content -this implies that several proxies manipulate traffic in the same way. Also, suspicious proxies do not manipulate traffic at each request: only 20% of them manipulate traffic all the time, while 40% do it less than 10% of the time.
In order to better understand the purpose of content manipulation, we resort to visual inspection. To minimize the effort, we first cluster manipulated content using affinity propagation clustering [5] . Specifically, we consider each piece of altered or injected content as a string and compute the distance matrix required by the clustering algorithm using the edit distance between each pair of strings. Among the output clusters, two of them cover about 60% of the content manipulation instances. The first cluster contains 84 instances of ad injection code, of which 50 can be linked to two companies that provide hotspot monetization services. The second cluster contains 47 instances of fingerprinting/tracking code, mostly javascript code that attempts to uniquely identify a user. Note that 30 out those 47 instances include rum.js, a popular library to monitor user-webpage interactions. Although rum.js is commonly used by CDN providers, there is no apparent motivation for a free proxy to inject such code.
The remaining clusters include the following instances of injected code. Nine instances, imputable to only two proxies, display religious-related content. Four times we witness metadata of pyweb, a popular proxy rewriting tool for live web content. Pyweb's metadata triggerered our detection, but further inspection shows no actual content rewriting. Finally, we could not figure out the semantics of the remaining 84 content manipulations either because they were obfuscated or because they were only a few bytes in size.
Takeaway: Few content manipulation strategies exist that are shared among many proxies, advertisement injection being the most frequent one. Suspicious proxies do not manipulate traffic constantly; ProxyTorrent's continuous monitoring is thus paramount to detect and avoid such proxies. Invalid X.509 Certificates HTTPS is supported by 13,069 proxies (about 45% of the working proxies) and 0.8% of them (110 proxies) were caught interfering with TLS handshakes.
The most common behavior among such proxies is to replace the original certificate with a self-signed one showing vague CommonName attributes such as "https" or "US". Three proxies provide certificates with CommonName matching the original domain but signed by "Zecurion Zgate Web", a company offering corporate gateways to mitigate information exfiltration, and "Olofeo.com", a French company that offers managed security services. Only one proxy delivers a certificate chain of size two, where the leaf certificate has the expected CommonName but the root certificate has CommonName Takeaway: Attempts of TLS interception are rare in the free proxy ecosystem. Modern browsers would easily detect these potential attacks and inform the user. Yet previous work has shown that users tend to click through warnings [1] .
Header Analysis We now analyze HTTP request and response headers with the two-fold objective of understanding the level of anonymity provided by proxies, and if header manipulations by free proxies goes beyond traffic anonymization. First, we focus on the working proxies observed at least once during six months. Then, we extend our analysis to proxies categorized as other. Figure 7 shows the top 10 request header modifications and injections performed by the working proxies we tested. Via, X-Proxy-ID, X-Forwarded-For, and Connection are the most frequently added headers. The first two headers are used by proxies to announce themselves to origin servers, while the third one specifies the client IP address to the origin server, when the proxy acts transparently. By leveraging those headers we classify proxies as: 1) transparent (77%), proxies that reveal the original client IP to the server; 2) anonymous (6%), proxies that preserve client anonymity but reveal their presence to the server; 3) elite (17%), proxies that preserve client anonymity and do not announce themselves to the origin server.
Connection is another frequently injected header. Roughly 60% of the proxies we tested set it to close or keep-alive. This behavior is not surprising as this header is reserved for pointto-point communication, i.e., between client and proxy or server and proxy. The Proxy-Connection header plays a similar role, and it is also added in about 10% of cases. Cache-Control is the only request header which is altered; about 10% of proxies modify this header to accept cached content with a given max-age value, despite our testing tools explicitly specify not to serve cached content. We also observe that less than 1% of proxies (not shown in Figure 7 ) modify the user-agent by either removing it or specifying their own agents. While the exposure of the client user-agent reduces anonymity, it allows the server to optimize the content served based on the user device and application. Figure 8 shows the top 10 response header modifications and injections performed by working proxies. As for the request headers, the Via header is among the most frequently injected one; this is used by proxies to to announce themselves and their protocol capabilities to clients. About 30% of proxies also add the X-Cache header to specify if the requested content was served from the proxy's cache or if a previously cached response is available. The most frequently modified header is the Connection header, that is either removed (50% of cases) or set to close. As previously stated, this is a common behavior as this header is connection specific and does not need to be propagated to the client. Finally, less than 10% of the proxies modify the Server header to reflect the software they use, rather than the one of the origin server.
Proxies categorized as others behave similarly to working proxies. However, we identify a non negligible amount of them injecting Set-Cookie (5%), Access-Control-Allow-* (1%), and X-Adblock-Key (0.5%) headers in response to clients. These headers expose clients to malicious or unintended activities. The Set-Cookie header pushes a cookie to the client that may be used for tracking. The Access-Control-Allow-* headers are used to grant permission to clients to access resources from a different origin domain than the one currently in use. These headers could be exploited for Denial of Service (DoS) or Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks. Finally, the X-Adblock-Key response header allows ads to be displayed at clients bypassing ad-blocker tools. Proxies injecting this header return a modified version of the requested webpage, including additional advertisements.
Takeaway: The free proxy ecosystem is mostly composed of transparent proxies which use HTTP headers to announce themselves and/or to reveal the client's IP address to the origin server. Header manipulation is not a common practice among working proxies; however, a non negligible amount of non-working proxies manipulate response headers to expose clients to potentially malicious activities.
Performance
We now investigate the performance of the free proxy ecosystem, or how fast can free proxies deliver content to their users. We use page load time (PLT) as a performance metric since it accurately quantifies end user experience [19] . However, PLT also depends on the composition of a webpage, i.e., its overall size and complexity in terms of number of objects. Accordingly, it has to be noted that PLT values from experiments in Phase III refer to our synthetic webpagesmall size and only few objects-while PLT values for experiments in Phase IV refer to proxies usage in the wild, i.e., overall bigger webpages with hundreds of embedded objects. Figure 9 shows the CDF of the average PLT measured through each proxy, distinguishing between suspicious proxies (suspicious), all proxies in the ecosystem (all), and the best performing proxies ProxyTorrent offers to its users (top). PLT values for both all and suspicious proxies are measured in Phase III, while PLT values for top proxies are measured in Phase IV. Failed downloads, where no PLT was measured are not taken into account. Figure 9 shows that suspicious proxies are faster than other proxies in the ecosystem, e.g., the median PLT they provide is 2x faster (7 seconds versus 15). The figure also shows that ProxyTorrent correctly identifies the best performing proxies since their PLT measured at the user is 1.5x faster than the rest of the ecosystem despite serving, on average, more complex websites (the average download size is 550KB versus only 158KB of our synthetic website).
Takeaway: Suspicious proxies are, on average, twice as fast as nonmalicious ones. Faster connectivity may be used by malicious proxy as a bait to attract more potential victims. Our finding support the popular belief that free proxies are "free for a reason", or so are the best performing ones.
Usage
We released ProxyTorrent's plugin on the Chrome Web store on March 17th 2017, and announced it via email, social media, and few forums on free proxies, anonymity, censorship circumvention, etc. At the time of writing Ciao has, on average, 275 weekly users who generate about 2,500 downloads every day, totaling 3 GBytes of HTTP/HTTPs traffic.
We start by investigating user preferences in terms of proxy location and anonymity level. We only analyze user preferences associated to active sessions (i.e., browsing activity through a proxy), about 50% of the total, and discard bogus data generated by automated tools that harvest the list of proxies we maintain. proxy locations. We label as "any" all the sessions where the user did not specify any location. "Any" is Ciao's default setting and the most popular one, accounting for 28% of the sessions. Overall, 70% of the sessions are spread between "any" and 5 countries: United States, Canada, France, Indonesia, and Brazil. These countries are also among the ones where most proxies are located (see Figure 4 ). Since Ciao shows how many proxies are available per country, it is possible that user preferences have been influenced by this information. Although not shown in the figure, for 79% of the sessions the users did not specify any anonymity level, which is again Ciao's default setting. When an anonymity level was specified, user preferences ranked elite proxies (14%), followed by transparent (5%) and anonymous (2%). We now investigate how Ciao is used in terms of which content is downloaded. Our analysis only relies on the little information we collect, i.e., download size and duration. Figure 11 shows a scatterplot of the size of each download (bytes) as a function of its duration (seconds). 98% of downloads are short (< 1 minute) and contain, on average, 500 KBytes. Despite their small sizehttparchive 6 reports that the average webpage size is 2.9 MBytesthese downloads are likely due to regular Web browsing. The smaller download sizes we observe are likely due to: 1) httparchive derives its statistics from crawling Alexa's top webpages while our workload is driven by free proxy users that may visit other websites, 2) our download size estimation is a lower bound on the actual webpage size as Ciao is oblivious to data retrieved from the browser's cache. Figure 11 also shows a non-negligible amount of downloads lasting several minutes (1.5%) and containing few 100 MBytes, as well as two very long downloads (up to couple of hours) containing few GBytes. These large downloads could be due to software or video downloads, live streaming, etc. We speculate the latter since no additional browsing activity was observed during these long sessions, i.e., the user did not open any other tab suggesting that she could be watching the content being retrieved.
Takeaway: Many users pick proxies in a few countries. Incidentally, such countries are the ones where most proxies are available. Users have no strong anonymity preference and use free web proxies for regular web browsing as well as streaming.
CONCLUSION
Fueled by an increasing need of anonymity and censorship circumvention, the (free) web proxy ecosystem has grown wild in the last decade. Such ecosystem consists of hundreds of thousand of hosts, few with little resources available, many relaying traffic due to misconfigurations, most not working at all. It follows that finding a free proxy is hard, and it is even harder to know whether free proxies can be trusted to carry potentially sensitive traffic. In this work, we built a system to "untangle" such complex ecosystem. ProxyTorrent is a distributed measurement platform that mixes active and passive measurements to monitor the free proxy ecosystem and assess its performance and behavior. ProxyTorrent also monitors how proxies are used by means of a Chrome plugin that offers easy proxy lookup and usage, in exchange of anonymous usage statistics. We provide statistics on the free proxy ecosystems by leveraging six month worth of data spanning 160,000 proxies and more than 1500 users.
